

A Resource for the Euro-Med Agenda

André AZOULAY and Andreu CLARET

The Euro-Mediterranean region is experiencing the most challenging and hazardous situation of the last two decades. Twenty years ago, in the aftermath of the Oslo Peace Accord, which was intended to solve the most complex conflict of the region, the European Union, most of the Mediterranean Arab countries, Turkey and Israel jointly launched the Barcelona Process. It was the most ambitious multilateral project of cooperation the region had ever known, ultimately aimed at creating a shared space of peace, stability and prosperity.

None of the three goals have been attained. There have of course been positive developments. Among them, the most important is probably the awakening of the civil society in the last years and its renewed capacity to become a player for social change in the region. Since 2010, we have observed converging demands of freedom, dignity and social justice that constitute a powerful and exciting reality. As a matter of fact, there are new and stimulating reasons for hope, but there are also perturbing causes for concern. On both shores of the Mediterranean.

An instrument for intercultural action

The second edition of the Anna Lindh Report tackles this paradoxical situation with scientific data and in-depth analysis on the evolution of values and perceptions in the region. Conceived from the very beginning as a tool for knowledge but also as an instrument for the intercultural action of the Foundation and its Networks, the Report confirms that, within most of the countries and in the region as a whole, the values-set is experiencing a positive and converging evolution. It tells us about the complexity of the current context, with cultural trends showing new opportunities for dialogue and coexistence and others which might fuel exclusion and sectarianism if they are not reversed.

As Claire Spencer underlines in her contribution, the Survey carried out by Gallup in 13 Euro-Mediterranean countries shows that 'there is a growing appetite for mutual knowledge and understanding'. This renewed appetite, which is in line with the growing demand for exchanges, mobility, and personal contact we perceive from the Anna Lindh Foundation is a very encouraging trend. It shows that despite the scarce results of the process of regional integration, and

the political tensions existing at the sub regional level, what prevails at the bottom of the societies is a movement in favour of knowing more about the others and sharing with them concerns and possible solutions. This interest in approaching the other is particularly relevant in the religious field where the Survey shows a growth of mutual interest in the religious beliefs of those living on the opposite shore of the Mediterranean.

This conclusion confirms one of the main findings of the first Report which established that the region is not victim of a 'clash of civilisations' but rather a 'clash of ignorances' based on historical stereotypes and the 'culturalisation' of social and political conflicts promoted by some media and political discourses. As Mohamed Tozy says 'the result of the Survey carried out in 2013 (...) reinforces the idea of convergence of the representations which erodes the thesis of the clash of cultures and shows that it is the religious variable which continues to inspire social inclinations towards a normalisation'.

Nevertheless, this 'growing appetite' for interacting with the other appears beside another data which might constitute a challenge for fostering dialogue and cooperation. It is the fact, identified by Sara Silvestri, that 'half of the population of the entire region thinks that diversity is a threat for social stability'. Such a result, which seems to have increased slightly in the last years, on both shores of the Mediterranean, is particularly worrying bearing in mind that diversity is a growing reality in all the region, fuelled by human movements, technological changes and social and cultural transformations. Considering diversity a peril will make more challenging the work of those, like the Anna Lindh Foundation, who are trying to present diversity as a potential richness. The perception of diversity within the societies as a threat is a reality in some European countries, fuelled by the lack of common and efficient policies to manage migration flows, and by the rising of populist approaches which are exploiting the complexity of migrant's integration. It is also a growing reality in most of the southern countries of the Mediterranean basin, which are becoming net receivers of migrants coming from sub-Saharan Africa. Attitudes against the other who lives in our neighborhood and communities are on the rise on both shores, and they affect not only migrants, but also other minorities, ethnic, religious or cultural.

Both trends, the positive one, expressing the desire of more cross Mediterranean interaction, and the one which shows suspicion and fear about the neighbour who is different, should be read carefully by the Foundation for adapting its strategy and programme to the evolving cultural context. The Foundation should leverage the mentioned 'appetite' of knowledge, multiplying its support to any kind of cross cultural exchange in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The existence of such a desire for meeting the other should be the basis of the Anna Lindh Foundation programme in the coming years.

But the Foundation should not avoid the fact that intercultural dialogue starts in the neighborhood. Without this 'local' dimension, intercultural dialogue will lack coherence and credibility. As Amin Malouf said bluntly, 'it is with those closest to us that we fight most bitterly'. In 2004, the 'founding fathers' of the Anna Lindh Foundation anticipated this challenge stating that the relationship with the other is most problematic with those who are closest. Now, in light of some of the data of the Anna Lindh Report on Intercultural Trends, their advice is more important than ever: 'The question of cultural relationship in the Euro-Mediterranean area begins for each individual at his own door, for the southern as much as the northern countries'.

Impact of the Arab movements

To what extent what we call the awakening of the Arab societies might have affected both trends: the positive and the regressive? The Gallup Survey gives us some clues, which are in general constructive. It seems that the perspective of social and political changes in many Arab countries impacted positively the will of interaction and facilitated a cultural rapprochement. What happened in 2011 and 2012 in the southern shore of the Mediterranean eased such a rapprochement, in both directions: the European public opinion 'discovered' that the values which are at the core of the European project were exhibited by millions in the Arab streets and squares. The perspective of a democratic evolution in many Arab countries, either through changes or reforms, challenged the traditional and deeply rooted orientalist perception about the incompatibility between Islam and democracy. In the South, the initial uprisings stimulated the logic of exchanges with Europe based on democratic values that were no longer perceived as imposed by foreign powers, but home grown. As Larbi Sadiki points out, in a region coming to grips with values associated to freedom, rights, and gender roles, societies 'seem to be marching, slowly but surely, towards acceptance of attitudes integral to learning democracy and citizenship'.

Are those conclusions still valid in 2014? We know from other polls that the first positive impact has been overshadowed by the difficulties of the Arab democratic transitions. After considering the results of the Survey in Egypt 'particularly positive' regarding the confidence and independence shown by the majority of the people pooled, Dina El Khawaga raises the question of the impact of what happened since then in this country on the public opinion, anticipating that an updated Survey will most probably reflect less serenity and openness than in 2012.

It is too early to conclude about how the current skepticism about short term achievements of the transitions will impact on the values set and mutual perceptions across the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, most of the observers agree that sectarianism as a political tool has developed, threatening the capacity of leaving together in many Arab countries. The situation affecting Syria and the danger of contagion of its extreme sectarian conflict in countries like Lebanon might reinforce the idea that diversity – even diversity within Muslim societies – is a threat. For the Anna Lindh Foundation, such a menace raises the urgency of promoting, at the community level, and particularly among young people, a culture of dialogue and citizenship, based on valuing cultural diversity as a richness. Programmes like 'Young Arab Voices' and 'Dawrak-Citizens for Dialogue', launched during the last two years, and oriented at building open and plural societies are more convenient in light of the conclusions of the Report and the evolution of the situation in the region.

Challenges of diversity

And what about Europe, in comparison with the Survey of 2009? The good news of the first Survey are confirmed, in terms of a noticeable interest for the realities of the southern countries, which seems to have been reinforced by the appreciation of the changes happening in the Arab countries. Nevertheless, some analysts like Antoine Messara concluded, suitably, that the Europeans appear uncertainly fearful. 'Afraid (to lose) their well-being, security and peace in everyday life, their democratic achievements, their rights in terms of social benefits, leisure and vacation'. This conclusion, which finds some correlation in the political field in terms of manipulation of the identities (mistakenly endangered by the migrants or by loss of sovereignty in favour of the EU), might have an impact on the prioritisation of values (increase of religion in the scale of value priorities) and on the perception of the other. Quoting Solzhenitsyn, Messara alerts about the danger of a 'moral collapse' and observes what he calls 'the regression of courage' among the European elites and societies.

Such a pessimistic diagnostic should be balanced by the positive trends which appear also in the Survey. In terms of a value-set which still gives a great importance to the acceptance of diversity, and by the adherence of the majority to the values which are at the core of the European project. In any case, the results of the Survey should be put in the context of the political and social changes and the cultural transformations. In this regard, there are plenty of reasons for the Anna Lindh Foundation, to reinforce its projects and activities oriented at facing the danger of any cultural regression.

As it happened in 2009, the Survey shows that the appraisal for a common Euro-Mediterranean project will depend on its capacity for enhancing cultural diversity and fostering innovation and entrepreneurship. The conclusion is of utmost importance for increasing the ownership of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) among the public opinions of the region. The UfM will be assessed by our societies according to its capacity for promoting innovation and entrepreneurship and for making our societies a place to live together in diversity. A conclusion which is of great importance for the two institutions of the Union, the UfM Secretariat and the Anna Lindh Foundation. In order to increase the ownership among the societies of the UfM, the challenge is to respond to what Claire Spencer calls the 'the end of top-down visions and frameworks designed by inter-governmental committees'.

Orientations for the intercultural dialogue agenda

Complemented by local and action-oriented perspectives of some of the Anna Lindh national coordinators, this second edition of the Report should contribute to adapt the Foundation's programme to the new realities of the region in the coming years. The data offered by the Survey about intercultural trends and social changes are the basis for understanding better the societies we live in, and the plurality of perspectives and analysis of the Report will foster a necessary debate about how to respond to such a volatile environment.

The global picture of the societies of the region which emerges in the Survey and its analysis is better than the one we get every day through the mainstream news. There are motives for been concerned but also reasons for hope. It seems that citizens' values are resilient enough to respond judiciously to the winds of political uncertainty and social upheaval which are blowing across the region. As Juan Diez Nicolas notes, social values and attitudes usually have a great stability and the changes which might happen in three years should be analysed carefully. There are no major

variations in the opinion of the majorities, in relation to the Report of 2009, but even if it is still supported by minorities among the public opinion, the emergence of regressive attitudes should be followed carefully and taken into account for any strategy of cooperation and intercultural dialogue. On the other hand, the extreme complexity of the current situation advises not to support a one-size-fits-all interpretation. In the last three years, the region became more varied, both in Europe, as a consequence of the economic crisis, and in the Arab countries, as a consequence of transitions and the Syrian conflict.

The inaugural edition of the Report, carried out on the eve of the Arab uprisings, told us about the inquietude existing in the Euro-Mediterranean societies and it somehow helped the Foundation to be better prepared to react to what happened a few months later in the Arab countries and to adapt our programme to the new context. Do we get a common message from this second edition of the Report, valid for all the region? If there is one, it is probably that intercultural dialogue should be based, more than ever, on bringing together the people of the region, providing them with spaces for dialogue and opportunities for action. The citizens resilience is an asset which should be leveraged against any regressive cultural trend, and the will of knowledge, curiosity and exchange which appear in the Report, is the best asset for making civil societies sharing democratic values.

For the Anna Lindh Foundation - which marks a coming of age in 2014 with its tenth anniversary - the Report has proved a validation of the bold decision of our institution's forefathers to anticipate the centrality of civil society in Euro-Med cooperation. The same findings must now be the basis for leveraging on an even greater scale the next decade of the Foundation's work, to provide a space to tackle those issues that have undermined previous attempts to build a partnership among citizens. And for the Union for the Mediterranean whose creation, in the end, succeeded in provoking a new conversation about how to construct a sustainable partnership based on real co-ownership without double standards, there are lessons here. Top-down solutions will not work, as the Report findings underline, and the union must be built on the cultural and aspirational convergences between the citizens of the Mediterranean.

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Inside the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll

Robert MANCHIN

It was the second time that a large, representative survey used the tools of modern social sciences to provide a snapshot of the public opinion in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The first Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll was conducted in August and September 2009, in several European countries and countries bordering the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM). The first wave of the Poll included eight European countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and five SEM countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Turkey). The current Poll is the second of its kind and was specifically designed to monitor changes since the Arab Spring.

The Survey was carried out on the basis of the Gallup methodology through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) on landlines and mobile phones with a sample of 1,000 individuals representative of all parts of each country, including rural areas. The target population included all individuals aged fifteen and above, with the opinion poll questionnaire translated into the major languages of each country, and quality control procedures used to validate that the correct samples were selected and that the correct person was randomly selected in each household, according to the Random-Digit-Dial (RDD) sampling method. The fieldwork captured the opinions in the autumn of 2012, three years after the initial Survey. Some of the countries were the same in both studies, while others changed in order to provide as wide a coverage as possible. About 13,500 interviews were conducted with citizens in eight European countries (Albania, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland and Spain) and five SEM (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey). Two European countries (Germany and Spain) and three countries from the SEM (Egypt, Morocco and Turkey) were included in both the first and second Anna Lindh/Gallup Polls.


The present paper summarises the most important indicators monitored and based on questions asked among the general population in every country on their interest in issues like cultural diversity, perception and knowledge of cultural differences, spaces of encounter, religion, and mutual perceptions. The results hopefully contribute to bridge the gap in perceptions and to understand the existing differences and divergences between people and communities across the two shores of the Mediterranean. Some

of the results of the study will also help tackle misperceptions and rebuild human and cultural bridges in the Mediterranean region and ultimately facilitate the actions of civil society, decision-makers and opinion-leaders. The solution can be dialogue with the long-term perspective of shaping the Euro-Mediterranean space as an area of cooperation, exchange, mobility and peace as expressed in the ambitious but humanist core values and objectives of the Anna Lindh Foundation.

Representations of the Mediterranean

Respondents on both sides of the Mediterranean shared an overall positive image of the Mediterranean region: when presented with several associations that people may have when thinking about the region, respondents from both country groups tended to choose positive characteristics over negative ones.

Chart 1.1 Characteristics of the Mediterranean region



Survey Question: Different people have different thoughts about what the Mediterranean region represents. I will read out a set of ideas/images that may come to the minds of different people, and please tell me, if you think these characterise the Mediterranean region strongly, somewhat or not at all. **Base:** % of all respondents % of sum of 'Strongly characterises the region' and 'Somewhat characterises the region' by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).


The Mediterranean evokes first of all a strong common heritage – feelings and associations that go much deeper and beyond the daily political news. About nine in ten interviewees in Europe and about eight in ten in SEM countries associated the Mediterranean region with a common cultural heritage and history, a Mediterranean way of life, and hospitality. However, while both the self-perception and the general judgment about the region acknowledges the openness to the stranger as it appears from the emphasis given to hospitality (towards the other) as a key characteristic of the Mediterranean region, this space was also perceived as a source of conflict by about seven in ten respondents, (Chart 1.1, 1.2).

Despite sharing many common images in their representations of the Mediterranean, respondents from the two country groups differed characteristically in their responses as well. For Europeans, the Mediterranean region is more often linked to a certain type of lifestyle and food compared with respondents from southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (91% vs. 79%), and the first are the ones who are

more likely to associate the region with turmoil and insecurity (78% vs. 71%) .


At the same time the question can be asked: are people in Europe and in SEM countries referring mentally to the same countries in their concept of ‘Mediterranean’? The image of the Mediterranean region is partly different because people are associating different countries to the region. For Europeans, the Mediterranean means overwhelmingly Italy – seven out of ten respondents are saying that it is the country that comes to their mind when hearing about the Mediterranean region. Greece is the second most often mentioned country, followed by Spain and France. The top three country associations among the respondents in SEM are Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. Indeed a very different mental map – where Greece is mentioned only by 7% of respondents for example, compared to every second mention in Europe. The common definition and understanding of the region is associated with different country stories and the associated narratives are reflecting this as well. The list of countries mentioned is affected also by the

Chart 1.2 Characteristics of the Mediterranean region



Survey Question: Different people have different thoughts about what the Mediterranean region represents. I will read out a set of ideas/images that may come to the minds of different people, and please tell me, if you think these characterise the Mediterranean region strongly, somewhat or not at all. **Base:** % of all respondents % of sum of ‘Strongly characterises the region’ and ‘Somewhat characterises the region’ by country (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

Chart 1.3 Interactions in the EuroMed region




Survey Question: In the last 12 months have you personally talked to or met with any person (or persons) from countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea / European countries? **Base:** % of all respondents, % of ‘Yes’ by country (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

countries surveyed since, especially smaller countries, like Croatia or Albania, are more easily known and recognised as Mediterranean in Europe, where 17-14 % of respondent mentioned them while in SEM only 1 and 2 % mentioned them spontaneously.

Despite sharing many common images in their representations of the Mediterranean, respondents from the two country groups differed characteristically in their responses as well. For Europeans, the Mediterranean region is more often linked to a certain lifestyle and food than for respondents from SEM (91% vs. 79%), and the first are the ones who are more likely to associate it with turmoil and insecurity (78% vs. 71%). When talking about the perceptions in the two regions, it is clear from the above comparisons that the similarities are more striking than the differences. The rank order of the mentioned ideas/ images are almost the same. The notable exception is the stronger emphasis on the common cultural heritage and history in the South and the relatively higher mention of the way of life and the food in the

Chart 1.4 Method of interaction



Survey Question: How did you meet or talk to that person? **Base:** Those who talked to or met with persons from other countries, % of mentions by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

North. The politically related associations in both regions are the least mentioned. But beyond the general similarities the country by country differences in the North are also worth noting.

The timing of the Survey as well as the different political developments at the time of its implementation also impact on the different perceptions. For example, while roughly eight in ten respondents Morocco (83%) and in Tunisia (77%) agreed that the Mediterranean region was characterised by a resistance to change slightly less shared this view in Egypt (about seven in ten respondents), Jordan and Turkey (67%-70%). Similarly, 85% of Moroccans and 81% of Tunisians associated the Mediterranean region with civic participation in democratic transitions; among respondents in Turkey, Jordan and Egypt, this proportion varied at a slightly lower level: between 68% and 76%.

One of the persistent misconceptions about the Mediterranean region, especially in Europe, is that a large proportion of citizens would like to leave their country of birth in order to live somewhere else. The economic and social crises that affected societies everywhere were definitely reflected in the aspirations of people in Europe as well. Only a minority (40%) in Europe said that if they had a choice they would start a new life in their own country. The proportion in SEM is much higher – 58%. The country by country differences in the proportion of those who prefer to start a new life in a different country from the one they currently live in stimulate reflections on the perceived frustrations of the given society. One


striking difference however is clear: contrary to the dominant perception it is citizens of the European countries who would rather live in a different country than their own. In Ireland – a country deeply affected by the crisis, only 18% would start their new life in Ireland and in Albania practically everybody would choose another country (82%).

Among the five countries surveyed in the South it is only Jordan where the majority would rather live somewhere else. Over one third of the people surveyed in Jordan would start their new life outside their current region.

Meeting and getting information on the other


Looking at the possibilities of dialogue between the regions, we find that interactions occur much more commonly in European countries. On average, 41% of interviewees in Europe answered that they had some contact with people from SEM over the past year; this figure ranged from 26% in Poland to 55% in Belgium and 59% in Albania. In SEM, in line with

Chart 1.5
Interest in news and information about SEM / European countries




Survey Question: Thinking about the countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea / European countries, how much interest would you say you personally have in news and information about their...? **Base:** % of all respondents % of sum of 'Very interested' and 'Somewhat interested' by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

Chart 1.6
Interest in news and information about SEM / European countries



Survey Question: Thinking about the SEM / European countries, how much interest would you say you personally have in news and information about their ...? **Base:** % of all respondents % of sum of 'Very interested' and 'Somewhat interested' by country (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

Chart 1.7
Most important values to respondents when bringing up their children



Survey Question: In bringing up their children, parents in different societies may place different emphasis on different values. Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only I'd like to know which one of the following six would you say is most important when raising children? And the second most important? **Base:** % of all respondents, of sum of 'Most important' and 'Second most important' by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

the results from three years ago, respondents in Morocco most often had been in contact with people from Europe (57% in 2012 - 38% in 2009), while only a minority of respondents in Turkey met or talked to Europeans during the previous year (2% in 2012 - 24% in 2009). (Chart 1.3) As in 2009, respondents in European countries who met people from SEM did so most often for business reasons (35%) or during a holiday trip (37%). Respondents from SEM also most frequently mentioned business reasons (33%); however, compared to respondents in Europe, a larger proportion of SEM respondents answered that they had used the Internet as means of communication (19% vs. 6% for respondents in Europe) (Chart 1.4).

The importance of internet as a tool of communication is striking. It is especially important for those living in the SEM countries. As to any inter-action there is a need for two sides, and in principle surveys, if based on valid representative samples should be similar in distributions when talking about mutual interactions, actions that are basically one sided must be suspicious. While tourism gives a chance mainly to Europeans to interact, chatting over the internet is more a tool to keep social interactions and regular contacts with those members of the social network who are living abroad.

As to the content of the interactions the Poll reveals differences as well. As a general observation, we can say that the overall level of interest in news and information related to the other region is higher in Europe. But this does not mean that there is no openness and general interest in news and information about Europe among people in SEM. The majority reports in every subject that they are at least 'somewhat interested'.

A majority of respondents in both country groups were at least somewhat interested in news and information about the other countries' cultural life and lifestyle, economic conditions, political changes, and religious beliefs or practices. For example, 78% of respondents in Europe said they were somewhat or very interested in political changes that had occurred in SEM; the corresponding figure for SEM respondents' interest in news and information on political changes in European countries was 68% (Chart 1.5). But within the relative rank order of interest it is SEM citizens who are the most interested in this aspect of life in the other region, while Europeans are mainly interested in the cultural life and lifestyle of the South.


The lowest interest was reported when it came to the religious beliefs and practices. This is the single largest dividing line between the mostly secular Europe and the overwhelmingly religious SEM countries. The nature of interest is also driven by this underlying difference. Only a slight majority in SEM countries was at least somewhat interested in how Europeans practice (or not) their religion. On the other hand, even if religious aspects proved to be the area of least interest for Europeans towards SEM, about two thirds of respondents expressed some interest in this particular regard.

Among respondents from SEM, those in Morocco were the most likely to consistently report being interested in news and information from European countries (for example, 76% in Morocco said they were interested in political changes in European countries and 84% were at least somewhat interested about news related to the European economy). Even if interviewees in Egypt - each time - were the least eager to learn more about European countries, they can still be counted among a majority at least somewhat interested in the political and economic developments in Europe (Chart 1.6).

Values underpinning behaviour

Referring to the differences in terms of the relative interest levels on matters of religious beliefs and practices, related values are also very instructive on this fundamental underlying value differences (Chart 1.7). A good example is the tendency of the majority of

Chart 1.8
Opinion on the existence of absolute guidelines



Survey Question: Some people believe that there are absolute guidelines to what is good and bad, and what is truth. Others say that there are no absolute guidelines, things are relative and what we consider to be good or bad depends on the circumstances. **Base:** % of all respondents, % by country (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

Europeans to doubt about the existence of absolute moral guidelines. The tendency to believe that what is considered good or bad is not predetermined but can change according to circumstances, a relativist moral standpoint, is probably the most revealing on the different ways that different societies observe and judge the events and the world in general.

The belief in an absolute truth was by far more widespread in SEM: 53% of respondents from that region believed that there were absolute guidelines to what is good and bad, and 37% thought that such guidelines depended on the circumstances. A majority (70%) of respondents in Europe, on the other hand, advanced the view that truth was rather relative; only a quarter of Europeans (26%) believed in an absolute truth (Chart 1.8).

The opinions are not directly shaped by religious traditions since at both the top and the bottom of the scale in Europe we find Catholic countries with

relatively large proportions of practicing believers. Italy and Spain, for example, two countries living through a deep crisis and deeply divided along ideological lines are the ones where the proportion of those that do not believe in the existence of absolute moral guidelines is the highest among the Protestant and secular Danish society. Albania is a special case like in many other aspects, coming out from a non-religious but officially Muslim background, where deeper commitment to strong moral values is professed openly by only a tenth of the population.


In Morocco, 80% of respondents said they believed in an absolute truth, and 19% answered that what was true or false depended on the circumstances. Respondents in Jordan, Turkey, Tunisia and Egypt were divided in their views – although 44%-52% of the population in these countries believed that truth was absolute, almost the same proportions (34%-49%) believed that what was true or false depended on the circumstances. The case of Egypt has to be looked at carefully – as the timing of the Survey reflected also on the responses. While the respondents in each of the other SEM countries choose one of the offered response alternatives, one-fifth of the Egyptian respondents avoided to answer. If we assumed that the majority of the 22% who did not answer the question in reality also believes in the existence of absolute guidelines (an assumption that is supported by other survey results by Gallup and others) we could have different results, (Chart 1.8).

The role of women in society, and perspectives for the future

Attitudes and social norms that are rapidly changing are mainly related to women's role in society. On average, across Europe and on both shores of the Mediterranean, roughly six in ten interviewees thought that women now play a more important role in their society than five years before, while about three in ten respondents answered that nothing had changed in this regard. Respondents in SEM countries, however, were more likely than their European counterparts to think that the role of women in their society would become even more important in the next five years (66% and 56%, respectively).

Among respondents in SEM countries, Moroccans were the most likely to believe that women would play a more important role in their society in five years' time (89%). The proportion expressing this view was also high in Tunisia (63%), Turkey (75%), Jordan (78%), and Egypt, where 48% of respondents thought that women's role in their society would become more important in the next five years. In most of the European countries surveyed, the proportion of

Chart 1.9
Current personal life satisfaction




Survey Question: Taking everything into consideration, what would you say, compared to 5 years ago your present life situation, is... **Base:** % of % of all respondents, % by country (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

interviewees who answered that women would play a more important role in their society in the years to come remained below 60%; the most important exception being Albania, where 73% of respondents selected this response.

Expectations for the future are always coloured by the perceptions of the past and the present. A good illustration of this is that compared to the past the perception of change that led to the present situation is much more positive in the South than in the North of the Mediterranean. A slim majority of respondents in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries said that, taking everything into consideration, their present life situation was better than five years before; just 15% of interviewees in these countries stated that life had become worse. But the mood is most definitely shaped by the expectations for further improvement. Here, a majority of respondents were optimistic about the future: between 60% of respondents in Egypt and 82% in Morocco expected that their life situation would further improve in the coming five years. The Survey results document a far less positive picture

Chart 1.10
Personal expectations for the future




Survey Question: And how do you expect it will change in 5 years? Will it be... **Base:** % of all respondents, % by country (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

when looking at Europeans' own life evaluation. Overall, 27% of respondents reported that their life situation had deteriorated in the past five years; but this perception is significantly higher in the Mediterranean European countries – at the time of Survey, autumn of 2012, this proportion in Italy and Spain reached 39%-40% (Chart 1.9). Looking ahead, to the next five years, countries that were in the worst situation are the ones that can see possibilities of progress. Albania (where most almost 9 out of 10 people wish they could start a new life somewhere else) are hoping that life will be better in the future. Countries where the economic crisis impacted most on the life situation of respondents (Ireland, Italy, Spain) are the ones where about half of the people hope that things will turn to the better (Chart 1.10).

In this respect southern and eastern Mediterranean countries are definitely more optimistic – on average two-third of the population have high expectations towards the future life conditions. Again, this is partly driven by the perceived changes compared to the last five years, but at the same time this level of energy and

Chart 1.11
Ultimate effect of the 'Arab Spring' on the Euro-Arab relations by sub-region



Survey Question: Most of the Arab countries are experiencing significant changes started with social movements which have been called an 'Arab Spring'. What do you think, will be the ultimate effects of these changes on the relations between Europe and the Arab countries? Will these changes be [...] **Base:** % of all respondents, by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).


pressure toward changing personal life conditions are also building up pressure toward rapid social change. In Europe about one in every five people expect that the crisis is not temporary, that it has not even reached its bottom, and that the worse is still to come. In southern and eastern Mediterranean countries only a tenth of the population is expecting a possible deterioration of their life situation, (Chart 1.10).

The future of the region and the impact of the 'Arab Spring'

Personal life expectations are not unrelated to the overall perception of general social and political changes in the Arab world. At the time of the Survey the significant changes that Arab countries were experiencing, and which started with social movements that have been called an 'Arab Spring' were very much part of the general discussions about the future of the region. This future was also related to the expectations for the future of North-South relations. In the European countries surveyed, nearly half (45%) of the respondents thought that the ultimate effect of the Arab Spring on Euro-Arab relations would be positive, while almost 30% held an opposite view (10% did not expect any consequences in this regard and 15% could not tell what could be expected).

A rather similar picture emerged in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries; although it should be noted that the proportion of 'no effect' responses in this country group was somewhat higher (14% vs. 10% in Europe), at the expense of the proportions expressing a positive view (42% vs. 45% in Europe)

Chart 1.12
Ultimate effect of the Arab Spring on the Euro-Arab relations by country




Survey Question: Most of the Arab countries are experiencing significant changes started with social movements which have been called an 'Arab Spring'. What do you think, will be the ultimate effects of these changes on the relations between Europe and the Arab countries? **Base:** % of % of all respondents by country, where: the 'Positive' effect: sum of 'Very positive' and 'Positive' answers, and the 'Negative' effect : sum of 'Very negative' and 'Negative' answers (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

(reference to Chart 1.11). Among respondents in the southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, those in Morocco were the most likely to think that the effect of the Arab Spring on Euro-Arab relations would be positive (52% of 'positive' responses). In Turkey, on the other hand, just 35% of respondents expected such a positive outcome, while 37% thought that there would be negative effects following the Arab Spring and another 21% expected no effects at all. Nonetheless, in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, the largest proportion of 'negative' responses was measured among the population in Tunisia (36% 'negative' responses) (Chart 1.12).

Respondents in Belgium and Poland appeared to be as negative in their evaluation of the Arab Spring as their counterparts in SEM countries; 39% answered that the effect would be negative. This result was in sharp contrast to the majority of respondents in

Chart 1.13
Most efficient ways of solving problems in society



Survey Question: How do you think you could most efficiently contribute to solving the problems in your country? **Base:** % of all respondents by region (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

Denmark who believed that the ultimate effect would be positive (68%).

Emerging ways to contribute to social development

When asked about how they could personally contribute to solving problems in their society, 20% of respondents in European countries answered that joining a social movement would be most efficient to this purpose, followed by 12% who thought about joining or supporting a political party or an NGO. In southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, joining or supporting a political party (15%) was considered a more efficient way to contribute to solving problems than joining a social movement (13%) (Chart 1.13).

Interestingly, across many countries, a considerable proportion of respondents had confidence in their own individual actions to solve problems in their society (e.g. 43% in Denmark and 38% in Tunisia and Morocco). In Germany and Turkey, on the other hand, very few respondents selected this response (9% and 1%, respectively). At the same time, a substantial proportion of the population in several countries – on both shores of the Mediterranean – felt that there

was no efficient way for them to be in a position to contribute to solving the problems in their society. For example, 29% of respondents in Italy, 35% of those in Egypt and 27% in Turkey feel incapable to participate, or contribute to, problem-solving at the level of their communities and societies.

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
Religion and Social Cohesion at the Heart of the Intercultural Debate

Sara SILVESTRI

Social cohesion is today at the core business of intercultural relations. Through the prism of religious beliefs and cultural diversity, Sara Silvestri analyses the quality of interactions among the citizens of the Euro-Mediterranean region, as well as potential areas of convergence around key values and sensitive topics. She reflects on the evolution of trends between the two Anna Lindh/Gallup surveys, positively observing a coming together around the importance of family solidarity, and openness to pluralism within societies.

It is commonly assumed that religious and cultural identities matter in the Euro-Mediterranean region and that growing cultural and religious diversity poses a challenge to national identities, social cohesion, and political and economic stability. The wealth of fresh information provided by the Anna Lindh/Gallup Opinion Polls opens precious insights into themes that are at the heart of intercultural relations.

Chart 3.1
Interest in news and information about SEM and European countries in 2009 and 2012



Survey question: "Thinking about the countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea/European countries, how much interest would you say you personally have in news and information about their Economic conditions; Cultural life and lifestyle; Religious beliefs and practices; Political changes?" **Base:** All respondents, % of sum of 'Very interested' and 'Somewhat interested' by regions. Chart compiled by S. Silvestri using data from Anna Lindh/Gallup Polls 2009 and 2012 (© Silvestri, Anna Lindh/Gallup 2012).


Faith: Coexistence of convergences and divergences

It is commonly thought that religion has a central place in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries' societies, and that it is increasingly irrelevant North of the Mediterranean. Instead, the ALF/Gallup Polls reveal unexpected results. Partial convergence, as well as divergence, is visible across the region when considering attitudes to either religious beliefs and practices, or to the value of religious and cultural diversity, as well as when comparing and contrasting the two.

Both in the 2009 and 2012 polls, the least amount of respondents in each set of countries declared to be interested in the religious beliefs and practices of the other group, compared to the number of those attentive to cultural life or economic conditions (Chart 3.1). Yet, in the course of those three years, this theme increased dramatically in importance in the whole Euro-Mediterranean region. The religious beliefs and practices of the other side of the Mediterranean mattered to only 45% of the SEM respondents in 2009. By 2012, this figure rose by six points (to 51%). In Europe, 68% of people held it significant, versus the previous 57% (that-is-to-say an increase by 11 points). What are the causes and implications of these upward shifts? And how do they relate with the relevance of religious beliefs and the phenomenon of cultural and religious diversity, in each group of countries and on a domestic level?

On the one hand, religious beliefs and practices are at the bottom of the list of potential mutual interests in the whole region. This could indicate a certain level of widespread secularist-inspired indifference to the topic of religion. Such a reading would be justified by the common assumption that European societies are highly secularised. The ensuing expectation would be that the recent democratic transitions in SEM countries have opened the way to secularisation and

Chart 3.2
Attitudes to religious values and cultural diversity in SEM and Europe in 2009 and 2012



Survey Question: Q.2 'Could you please tell me, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: Cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat for the stability of society/ is important for the prosperity of your society?' And Q.3 'In bringing up their children, parents in different societies may place different emphasis on different values. Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only I'd like to know which one of these six would you say is most important when raising children: Curiosity; Obedience; Religiosity beliefs; Independence; Family solidarity; Respect for the other cultures?' **Base:** Q.2: All respondents, % by regions, where 'Agree': sum of 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree somewhat' answers, and 'Disagree': sum of 'Strongly disagree' and 'Disagree somewhat' answers"; Q.3: All respondents, % of sum of 'Most important' and 'Second most important' by regions". Chart compiled by S. Silvestri using data from ALF/Gallup opinion Polls 2009 and 2012 (© Silvestri, Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

the dissemination of atheistic beliefs there too. On the other hand we noted a general increase in interest in others' religious beliefs between the 2009 and 2012. This result could therefore be interpreted as a sign of close – perhaps even intensifying – attachment to individual (as well as group) faith identities. This dynamic would demonstrate the on-going process of 'de-secularisation' of the world (reference to Berger, 1999) and potentially could entail in addition the risk of reduced attention to other cultures and religions. A cross analysis of the various sections of the Anna Lindh/Gallup Survey pertaining to religious beliefs and cultural diversity will help to unravel these puzzling results and will point to the simultaneous coexistence of multiple trends.

Respondents were given a list of values related to raising children and were asked to select the first and second most important ones. Regarding the appreciation of religious values in one's own context, Europe emerged predictably lower compared to the SEM in each round of polls (2012: 18% versus 49% SEM; 2009: 14% versus 62% SEM, Chart 3.2). Indeed, the least interested participants were from the most secularised countries of Northern Europe, such as Sweden or Denmark, which scored 5% (2009) and 6% (2012) respectively. Yet, the comparison of the 2009 with the 2012 data shows a curious inverse trend affecting the two sides of the Mediterranean (Chart 3.2). The number of respondents favourable to teaching religious beliefs to their children increased in Europe – both as a total average (from 14% to 18%) as well as in some individual countries, but decreased in SEM countries (from 62% to 49%).

In Europe, Germany experienced the most dramatic shift, with a rise of 15 percentage points (26% compared to 11% in 2009). As a result, this country rocketed from bottom to top of the European list, even above the predictably religious Catholic Ireland and Poland (which scored 17% and 19%). This contrasts with 2009, when Germany was among the least interested in this topic (11%), just before Sweden. Belgium scored 9% in 2012, which is not far from the 12% of France in 2009, a country with whom it shares various commonalities (such as language and level of secularisation). In Albania, 11% of respondents found religious values important. The atheist legacy of the country's Communist past has certainly contributed to a high level of secularisation, which puts Albania in line with the findings for France, Belgium and Spain. Spain showed a slight decrease in interest in faith values (from 13% to 11%) in 2012, which may be due to growing leftist and anti-clerical views in the country. In general, the Spanish findings diverge slightly from those for Italy (15%) and Poland (19%). These three countries are supposed to share an equally strong Catholic heritage, and yet they appear to align with countries with which they do not share religious similarities. For instance, exactly the same percentage of respondents (19%) in Hungary (2009) and in Poland (2012) stated that religious values are important for the education of their children. The views on this topic in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2009) and in Greece (2009) were very similar (20%), while Italian participants in 2012 replied like those in Great Britain three years before.

We can deduce from the above that the characteristics of specific religious traditions (e.g. Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, Islam) cannot be considered the only and central factors determining the actual relevance of religious values in individual societies

Chart 3.3
Comparing variables on religious values and respect for cultural diversity by country



Survey questions: Q.4 'Some people believe that there are absolute guidelines to what is good and bad, and what is truth. Others say, that there are no absolute guidelines, things are relative and it depends on the circumstances what we consider to be good or bad. Which view is closer to yours?' Q.2[...] People from different cultural, political or religious backgrounds should have the same rights or opportunity to participate in public life [...] Q.3 [...] Religious beliefs [...] Respect for the other cultures? **Base:** Q.4 All respondents, % by country; Q.2 as in Chart 3.2; Q.3 as in Chart 3.2 Compiled by S. Silvestri, using data from ALF/Gallup Polls 2009 and 2012 (© Silvestri, Anna Lindh//Gallup Poll 2012).

and how people relate to the reality of religious and cultural diversity. Instead we should pay attention to the political cultures, historical trajectories, and socio-economic challenges of the countries that we analyse. All these factors together are likely to impact attitudes to religion and diversity.

The Poll results about the relevance of religion for Europe's inhabitants are fascinating. They demonstrate that, on a personal intimate level, there remains considerable interest in faith issues, even though the role of organised or institutional religion has declined. In particular we note that attachment to religious values in 2012 has either remained stable compared to 2009 or has increased. The direction of the trend cannot be clearly identified because the 2012 poll included only two countries from the previous round and the results from these countries go in opposite directions. Spain lost two points, but Germany experienced a huge increase of those

focused on religious values. As a result the average for the whole region has been affected by this shift.

This eagerness to transmit one's religious values to future generation could be concerning to some, especially if seen in tandem with the German results about the theme 'respect for other cultures': the respondents in favour of this fell from 54% in 2009 to 35% in 2012. A less accentuated drop is also visible in Spain (from 67% to 61%). This alarming trend points to the spectres of racism and nationalism. But then it is alleviated when we look at how people answered, in the same countries, to the question of whether cultural diversity is beneficial for societal society: Germany in 2012 ranked like Italy, towards the top (84%) and Spain was midrange (79%). Simultaneously, we note contradictory and ambiguous attitudes to the topic of cultural and religious diversity. The number of those willing to teach respect for other cultures to their children decreased from 58% to 51% in Europe

from 2009 to 2012. Yet, in the same period we noted a rise in the interest in the cultural life and religious beliefs of the other shore of the Mediterranean.

Regardless of whether respondents felt a strong or weak attachment to their own and their country's faith traditions, they may have been triggered to become interested in these issues due to the realisation that their own societies – and the world – are changing, are becoming culturally and religiously more diverse. Hence, whether out of curiosity or by fear, they wish to know more about other societies religious beliefs and practices and, simultaneously, they increasingly treasure their own religious values. In the SEM, on the contrary, support for handing down religious values declined drastically: from 62% in 2009 to 49% in 2012. The most marked shifts concern Turkey where respondents thinking that religious values are important in raising their children dropped from 65% to 39%, and Morocco which went from 62% to 30%. Egyptian views also fell significantly, from 72% to 63%, equal with Tunisia. Simultaneously, views about respect for other cultures improved, attracting 28% of 2012 respondents versus the previous 18% (Chart 3.3)

All these changes sound exceptional but some are more surprising than others. Egypt is one of the SEM countries most renowned for its traditionalist attitudes and strong attachment to religion. In fact Egypt was top of the poll in 2009, with 72% of its respondents declaring that religious values were the most important thing in the education of new generations. But now it appears that Egyptian views have become identical to those of one of its most secularised and Westernised neighbours, Tunisia. The general decline in the number of those supporting religious values in the SEM is not immediately clear and would require additional research in order to be better understood. In Turkey, the shift may be related to recent intense public debates on the role of Islam in Turkish politics and society. The drop in attachment to religious values in Morocco and Egypt is somewhat more surprising but is consistent with the drop in the number of their respondents believing in the existence of 'absolute guidelines' (which is an implicit way to measure belief in supra-natural authority): 80% in Morocco in 2012 compared to the previous 88%, while Egypt went from 71% to 44%.

These findings are somewhat unanticipated, considering that both countries have seen an increase in political mobilisation on the part of Islamist movements recently. The latter, in theory, could have impacted (i.e. increased) on societal attachment to religious traditions, reinforcing in-group identities, and in the long term causing intolerance of diversity. There are undoubtedly societal tensions and competing

values in Egypt and Morocco at this delicate time of transition; this may explain why the two countries were last in the SEM scale of those believing in the benefit of religious and cultural diversity for societal prosperity (Egypt 78%, Morocco 82%) in 2012. Still, these percentages were higher than for instance those for some European countries (Chart 3.2).

The coexistence of high attachment to religious values with respect for other cultures in countries with active Islamist parties may be surprising to the lay reader but it confirms the research conducted by Moataz Fattah (Fattah, 2006) at the beginning of the 2000s in a large number of Muslim countries. He showed that support for political Islam did not automatically generate anti-women or anti-minority attitudes and that there were 'no statistically significant difference between Islamist and non-Islamist attitudes towards democratic institutions in any of the cases' he studied. These percentages are nevertheless quite high if taken individually, in line with the European average and actually even above Denmark (76%) and Belgium (72%). Additionally, when looking at the value 'respect for other cultures', both Moroccan and Egyptian attitudes raised considerably between 2009 and 2012: Egypt rose from 9% to 22%, Morocco from 13% to 42%, while Turkey lost 3 points (from 31% to 28%). Hence we can say that diversity is a complicated and divisive issue in all these countries but the situation is improving.

In 2009, 51% and 59% respectively of participants in Syria and Lebanon were favourable to passing on religious beliefs. These averages are lower compared to their SEM neighbours in the same year. Such lukewarm interest in religious values could be associated with the particular government approaches and constitutional arrangements of these two countries, which have promoted secular attitudes and lifestyles in order to manage their multi-ethnic and multi-confessional societies and prevent conflict. In fact these two countries were, together with Turkey (a country with a markedly secular constitution), the most open to religious and cultural diversity among the SEM in 2009: 15% Syria, 20% Lebanon, 31% Turkey.

One wonders what the results of the poll for Syria and Lebanon would be now, in the midst of a prolonged civil war in Syria and with all its ramifications, domestically and internationally, from armed violence, to humanitarian assistance, to migration, to regional balance of power. The closest data we have is for a neighbour, Jordan: 81% of its respondents in 2012 stated that religious beliefs are important for the upbringing of their children and 23% selected respect for other cultures. This data puts Jordan at the top of the SEM for religious values (just after

Egypt) and towards the bottom (just before Egypt) for the value of cultural and religious diversity that year.

Cultural and religious diversity: ambiguities and contradictory attitudes

Further insight into Euro-Mediterranean perceptions of faith and cultural and religious pluralism can be drawn from those sections of the poll that explicitly address the significance of religious diversity per se. The 2012 Poll introduced a new set of questions in an attempt to seize nuances within views about the value of cultural and religious pluralism. The results are especially interesting as they reveal considerable – perhaps higher than expected – similarities between the two shores of the Mediterranean, as well as the existence of contradictory trends within societies.

The percentage of those who regard cultural and religious diversity as important for the prosperity of their own society is almost identical in the SEM (83%) and in Europe (82%), whereas those who disagree are mostly located in Europe (15%, while 10% are in the SEM). The two sets of data combined show that overall SEM populations are more favourable than Northern ones towards religious and cultural diversity. This finding counters many assumptions and will surprise observers. It may be an indication of the democratisation dynamics taking place in the South, especially the new emphasis on freedom of opinion and of religion. However, when asked whether diversity is specifically important as a value in the education of one's children, it emerged, in 2012, as a priority for European countries (51%) but not for the SEM, where this theme attracted only 28% of the respondents.

It is striking that individuals that are strongly in favour of diversity in rather abstract terms are not necessarily ready to implement this in their own lives. This shows that attitudes are not always good indicators of actual behaviours. Still, we should acknowledge that the figure 28% is a considerable improvement from the earlier 18%. When attitudes to diversity are translated into views of actual participation in public life on the part of groups with a different religious or cultural background, support for diversity remains indeed high on both shores; but then Europe appears slightly more open (90%, versus 84% in SEM), and the percentage of those in disagreement becomes equal (9% on both sides). An explanation could be this: acceptance of political pluralism is a key characteristic of consolidated democracies and cannot be expected to happen from day to night after a prolonged period of authoritarianism. Additionally, acceptance of diversity in the European context may have been facilitated by

high levels of secularisation, while this process has not taken place in the same way in the SEM, although it is not absent there (for an elaboration of the varieties of secularism: Asad, 2003).

Taken together, all these answers about the value of cultural and religious diversity within individual societies could suggest future positive relations across and within the multifarious group of peoples living in the Euro-Mediterranean space. However, the picture becomes darker, when examining the next section of the opinion poll. Nearly half of the participants across all the countries polled in the Euro-Med believe that religious and cultural diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society (48% in Europe, 46% in the SEM). It is striking to note that fear of diversity coexists side by side with the positive attitudes just mentioned above, as well as in parallel with the earlier responses concerning interest in the culture and religion of the other shore of the Mediterranean. How is this contradiction possible and what are its implications?

To make sense of this it may be useful a) to consider how the same countries fared in relation to attitudes to religious values (see above), and also b) to contextualise these results by bringing into the picture other dimensions such as recent (and on-going) migratory movements, the emergence of faith-based politics, and the return of ethno-nationalist feelings all across the region. The so-called 'Arab awakenings' have brought to the fore religiously inspired political parties, such as the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and An-Nahda in Tunisia, as well as a number of other political actors with strong faith identities, both in these countries and in Syria and Libya. While bringing new opportunities for freedom of opinion and of religion, the political transitions have also uncovered ethnic and religious divisions and competition between groups within societies. So, this could explain the ambivalent positions towards diversity among the inhabitants of the Euro-Mediterranean area.

Immigration from the MENA into the EU grew steadily in the course of the 1990s and 2000s. This issue has often been exploited by populist right-wing movements in their political campaigns (Mudde, 2007). Influxes generated by the Arab uprisings since 2011 have added to the normal trend into Europe but have especially significantly affected the neighbouring states in the SEM. The difficulties in absorbing and caring for people that are fleeing situations of fear and instability – as well as simply looking for better opportunities to start a new life – are especially vivid in the context of a global economic crisis and in a weakened Eurozone. In the absence of growth and handicapped by spiralling rates of unemployment, the countries that constitute the migrants' first ports

of call in the Mediterranean Sea (e.g. Greece, Spain, Italy) have found it especially hard to face population influxes, despite having also experienced high emigration rates lately (OECD, 2013).

Convergence around family solidarity

From a normative perspective, European countries are highly supportive of the value of diversity: together with family solidarity this variable attracted in 2012 the largest percentage of responses (51% respect for other cultures, 60% family solidarity). Respondents in Italy, Denmark, Spain and Belgium valued most respect for other cultures when raising their children (scoring respectively 65%, 63%, 61% and 61%), while Poland and Ireland were midrange (51% and 59%). Albania, and Germany were the least interested (with respectively 30%, 35%). Positions reversed, though, when considering if religious and cultural diversity is important for the prosperity of society. The latter three countries scored top of the list of those in favour (87% Albania, 85% Ireland, 84% Germany, equal with Italy); Belgium and Denmark ended up bottom (72% and 76%) while Poland and Spain were close to each other in an in-between position (80% and 79%).

A rather unexpected result for the SEM concerns attitudes towards cultural and religious diversity. Although the SEM respondents did not consider diversity as a priority in the education of their children, compared to Europe, they had more positive expectations from diversity for the prosperity of society, scoring 83% versus 82%. Turks were the most favourable (88%), followed by Jordan (85%). Egypt was the least favourable (78%) in the SEM but it is important to note that this percentage is actually higher than the views coming from Belgium (76%) or Denmark (72%), two countries that are normally considered to be very liberal and open to diversity. Favourable respondents in Tunisia and Morocco were 81%. The ranking of SEM countries in terms of most/least supportive of diversity, however, changed slightly when the question reverted around the scenario of passing values onto children. Again, we have Egypt at the bottom (22%) and Turkey towards the top (28%) but respondents from Morocco (42%) appeared actually those valuing most respect for other cultures. The remaining SEM countries scored in the middle (Tunisia 25%, Jordan 23%).

In SEM countries, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon have been the main recipients of people fleeing Syria, experiencing, like European countries, economic and social difficulties associated with rising inflows of refugees as well as economic migrants (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012). Egypt too, besides going through a hard time domestically, on the political and economic

fronts, has also faced immigration from Syria and from Libya in the past few years. In turn these latter two countries were previously recipients of Iraqi refugees and African migrants. We should thus interpret negative attitudes to diversity not just as value statements; but try to understand them through the specific contexts in which they are expressed.

Perhaps unexpectedly, family solidarity is a value around which there is convergence across the whole Euro-Med region. This value featured as number one both in the SEM (52%) and in Europe (60%) during the 2012 Poll. The second position went to: respect for other cultures in Europe, and to religious beliefs in the SEM. These findings do confirm the (predictable) importance of religion in SEM societies. Yet they simultaneously indicate, in line with the results analysed above regarding the role of religion there is not as dominant as one would expect. In addition, it is somewhat surprising to note that family values are appreciated in Europe more than in SEM countries.

Each round of surveys consistently shows that those countries that are more attached to religious values are less interested in respect for other cultures, and vice versa and diversity slightly decreases in importance in Europe as we move from 2009 to 2012 but simultaneously acquires more significance in the SEM. We note a considerable convergence across the Euro-Med region around key values and very sensitive topics. As we go from 2009 to 2012 we note a reduction of polarisations in terms of values among countries. Median figures begin to prevail instead of very high or very low peaks. The common importance attributed to family values by all the people of the Euro-Med suggests that basic and intimate human relations associated with kindness, solidarity, mutual care and respect count more in the region than ideological or theological positions. Overall we have observed that religious values are a hidden but central theme running through the lives and concerns of the people living in the Euro-Mediterranean space.

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Respect for Cultural Diversity on the Basis of Ethical Standards

Antoine MESSARRA

Diversity cannot be understood as a factor of wealth and prosperity unless it is associated with a humanistic culture that adopts the respect for human rights. Antoine Messara argues that raising awareness of the diversity across our communities and Mediterranean region should be complemented by the implications of its management within society. From this perspective, the author traces a roadmap based on the concepts of normativity, religious diversity, and immunisation against the exploitation of fear and security.


The best sample survey, with the most developed questionnaire requires multiple interpretations that sometimes go beyond the interpretation of numerical results and the crossing of data. In the second Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll on intercultural trends in the Euro-Mediterranean area (2012), there are complex notions of diversity, civic engagement, social connection and commitment to the values of friendship and democracy. In a world ravaged by the tyranny of the opinion, what people say and declare to think is not necessarily indicative of a thought, an actual behavior and a full awareness of a problem. Think, from the Latin etymology (*pensare*) is ponder, think, judge, with the highest level of clarity. The values of diversity and harmony between freedom and public order are deployed today in a world ruled by fear, fear of safety, security blackmail and manipulation of fear in various ways in the Euro -Mediterranean area.

Pluralism and Diversity, from the perspective of perception and management

The requirement of respect for cultural diversity reached a high and almost equal score for the entire Euro-Mediterranean area (84% in European countries and 82% in SEM countries). It is significant that this score is strongly associated with the requirement of freedom and rule of law (respectively: 75% and 79%). Indeed, a collective and several centuries long heritage of conviviality can be disrupted if fundamental rights are violated. This entails the avoidance of a purely culturalist approach to cultural and religious pluralism. The legal dimension of diversity shall include religious freedom, the exercise of worship, religious education, the management of cultural spaces. American, European, African and Arab constitutional jurisprudence is explicit on these issues to reconcile the practice of faith with the requirements of religious freedom and public order. It is also significant that family solidarity reaches a priority score of 60% in European countries and 52% in the southern and eastern Mediterranean region,


which indicates the need to revitalise the social link, which is what makes a society. The requirement of 'respect for other cultures in the transmission of values to future generations' reached a higher score in Europe (51%) than in SEM (28%), which is explained by a tendency to closure on the self in the latter area. Religious beliefs is another element of differentiation between Europe and the SEM countries with only 18% of Europeans compared to 49% of the southern and eastern Mediterranean considering this a priority (reference to Chart 4.1).

Chart 4.1
Most important values to respondents when bringing up their children



Survey Question: In bringing up their children, parents in different societies may place different emphasis on different values. Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only I'd like to know which one of the following six would you say is most important when raising children? And the second most important? **Base:** % of all respondents, of sum of 'Most important' and 'Second most important' by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

Chart 4.2
Opinion on the existence of absolute guidelines



Survey Question: Some people believe that there are absolute guidelines to what is good and bad, and what is truth. Others say that there are no absolute guidelines, things are relative and what we consider to be good or bad depends on the circumstances. What is your opinion? **Base:** % of all respondents by country (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

Further differentiation is found about the belief in the existence of universal norms governing human and social relationships and social structures. Certainly, this kind of question is unambiguous, because universality and relativity are not opposed, but consequential having the universality of principles to cope with the relativity of implementing rules. For example, the universal principle of the separation of powers in democracy is absolute, otherwise the system becomes tyrannical, but the modality of application of the principle are multiple.


What does the bias on the issue of universality between European countries (only 26%) and southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (53%) signify? Is the contribution of humanity, the great philosophers, international conventions on human rights, international jurisprudence ignored, forgotten, denied under the eventual pretext of 'diversity' and 'respect of diversity'? Here we come to the heart of the problem of diversity and we need stop there (Chart 4.2), and to explore the related principles, rules, and standards.

What is different, from the Latin *diversus*, opposite, has several faces, several appearances. It is heterogeneous, disparate, multiple, mediocre, incoherent, in opposition... When does diversity become variety, richness, harmony? When you discover through diversity complementarity, upper and profound unity that ensures the harmony of the whole. In a tree, no-leaf is completely similar to another, by the size, shape, colour... What gives unity and harmony to this diversity, which appears at first sight chaotic, is the trunk that supports the tree, the sap that rises in the branches, soil, sun and other elements that feed together differently the whole tree. When we teach diversity, only to raise awareness about diversity without glimpsing through it that which gathers and unites, we help to understand certain religious and cultural phenomena but we do not bring people closer together. In the research and explanation of any form of diversity and of any unity, the sentence of Terence (Carthage, v. 190-159 av. J.-C.) must constantly inspire the work: 'I am a man, and nothing human is foreign to me' (*Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto*).

Between universal norms and diversity

The value of obedience, that reached a low score of 22% for Europeans and 26% for SEM, raises a concern. At least, we may arise many questions about the diversity of understanding of this concept through the translation of the questionnaire in several languages. Obedience can be interpreted as submission, but also as the respect of the rule, the norm and public order. The code, the norms, the benchmarks are a condition of the social link, of living together, of diversity as experienced and assumed, whether you are a believer, atheist, agnostic. Humanity, especially since the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the international charters of human rights, the international constitutional jurisprudence has developed a set of standards that are rather the fruit of experience, the requirements for living together in an organised society. We speak boldly about diversity, custom, specificity, dialogue, recognition of differences and other considerations in fashion. We should refer to practices that arise, such as in France where policy decisions are expected to manage diversity: the case of women burqa (full-face veil), of female circumcision for religious or customary considerations, surrogate mothers, the homosexual unions... Are we in the realm of the all permitted, liberalisation without limitation, anarchy, Nihilism, the denial of the very social reality, of what makes society? When respondents answer that the peoples of different cultures should have the same rights and opportunities to participate in public life, with a score of 90% in Europe and 84% in SEM, does this contradict the low score on the

Chart 4.3
Political, cultural and religious diversity as a basis for social prosperity




Survey Question: Could you please tell me, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'Cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of your society'? **Base:** % of all respondents by country (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

universal principles? Can we believe in the existence of universal and shared legal rules without believing in the religious, moral and ethical basis of these rules? Respondents with realism and while considering that cultural and religious diversity is a factor of stability apprehend that diversity that could be a threat to social stability, with 48% in Europe and 46% for SEM. (Chart 4.3) Unlike a dominant perception of young people without a compass, without reference, but basically thirsty for meaning, they become easy prey to clever manipulators and deceivers that provide the loan to think and eat. What is being done, as a family, in schools, universities and in the Euro-Mediterranean area, to cultivate critical thinking, the spirit of freedom, but freedom governed by law and social cohesion, to say nothing about morality or spirituality that may provoke the challenge or surprise. We are accustomed to road traffic. But everything else? The speed of gradient of this descent into the hell of obscurantism, oratorical silences, cautions of the analysis and white writing have their first source in family education, school, university, media that have apprehended

too much the tradition to rush unreservedly in a wild relativism. It is customary in university education and in prestigious universities in the world, to seek, analyze, criticize, to show intellectualism and learning. The time has come to have the audacity to think about questions of meaning, reference and purpose. When what was once called the 'Humanities' recede in school and university education, it is the ready-made intellectual that spreads the tyranny of opinion, intellectual and field terrorism. This is the trivialization of crime, of the attacks and the victims. It is the loss of the compass and landmarks that we live painfully. This is the age of manipulators who know how to fill the emptiness left by the bureaucrats of knowledge.

Democracy means primarily for respondents freedom in Europe and SEM, with a score of 46% and 49%. However, it is surprising that the rule of law is not seen as a priority, with a score of only 10% in Europe and 9% in the SEM. Also a decline is sensed in civic engagement. Joining social movements, political parties and support associations achieved an average total score 57% in Europe and 41% SEM. As for differentiation according to gender is not significant. The survey shows the increasing role of women in

Chart 4.4
Most efficient ways of solving problems in one's society



Survey Question: How do you think you could most efficiently contribute to solving the problems in your country? **Base:** % of all respondents by regions (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

society over the last five years and the growing perception of that role, especially in SEM (63% for current role and 66% for that role in 5 years from now). Democracy means primarily for respondents freedom in Europe and SEM, with a score of 46% and 49%. However, it is surprising that the rule of law is not seen as a priority, with a score of only 10% in Europe and 9% in the SEM. Also a decline is sensed in civic engagement. Joining social movements, political parties and support associations achieved an average total score 57% in Europe and 41% SEM. (Chart 4.4) As for differentiation according to gender is not significant. The survey shows the increasing role of women in society over the last five years and the growing perception of that role, especially in SEM (63% for current role and 66% for that role in 5 years from now).

Universal principles of human rights

We will focus on three issues that merit action in light of the Survey results and of the environment that explains the results. These are problems of normativity, religious diversity, and immunisation against the exploitation of fear and security.

Normativity: Diversity cannot be understood as a factor of wealth, harmony and prosperity unless it is associated with a humanistic culture that recognises and adopts the universal principles of human rights. The problem of universality and relativity deserves in the future more attention and to be understood through concrete practical cases.

Religious diversity beyond diversity: For the future there is a wide route to help religions find their soul ('faith' problem), to manage the public space where religion is expressed in the respect of liberties and public order (problem of 'law'), and to understand politics both as a game of power and management of general interest ('political' problem). Christianity is undergoing today a de-christianisation without reference in the name of a secularism often misunderstood. Islam, for historical reasons, has not thought enough about the practices of faith in the common public and shared space. Judaism must be distinguished from his Zionist ideology. Faith, law, politics, are not distinct in the mental structures, facing a popular academic trend that spreads confusion among atheists, believers, unbelievers, clerical, anticlerical, secularist intellectuals and citizens, the clash of civilizations will be around the corner with a wild and unbridled manipulation of the sacred.

Fear, safety and manipulation: There is the recognition and respect for differences, but there is also - in political mobilisation - a strong prosperous market,

that of the ideology of difference. What to do to better immunise against the ideologies of difference? The obsession with security, as a prerequisite for national and interstate peace has setbacks. You have to study and renounce techniques of manipulation, exploitation and safety blackmail and engage in opposition to manipulation techniques. How the conflict becomes controversial? The debate is often falsely about identity. The identity skin is often an exploited cover. We have to seek common space just to move forward on intercultural dialogue. Certainly we cannot detect intentions, but we can renounce the manifestations of bad faith.

Populations of so-called consolidated democracies are afraid. Afraid for their well-being, security and peace in everyday life, their democratic achievements, their rights to social benefits, the leisure and vacations. A state and interstate grouping terrorism manipulate fear and the lack of courage and of democratic involvement of people and of wealthy governments to expand and make of their neighboring states satellites and to generate overcautious democracies. Behind terrorism, that is the visible front, there is the blackmail to which more and more timid and frightened democracies submit to. The universality of human rights is threatened today despite all the achievements of civilization and globalization of justice and its normative jurisprudence, and this is mainly because of the extension of fanaticism, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the identity folds of the spread of terrorism and cultural relativism propagated by supermarket values.

It is the academic and social actors' task to focus more on the techniques of manipulation by governments and tyrannical interstate groups, authorities and contractors of security so that dialogue and mediation become more perceptive, lucid, focused and, therefore, more operational. To save the achievements of civilization requires courage. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his commencement address delivered at Harvard University in 1978 criticizes the Western world deploring its moral collapse, excessive industrialization, the mercantile bazaar, especially the regression of courage. After the Second World War Albert Camus said so presciently 'Each generation doubtless feels doomed to remake the world. Mine yet knows it will not do it. But its task is perhaps greater. It is to prevent the world from coming undone.' (Camus, 1957)

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A Vision for Social and Cultural Relations in the Euro-Med Region

Claire SPENCER

The latest Anna Lindh/Gallup Survey reveals a growing appetite for better knowledge and understanding, brought on by exchange among the actors of the region. Claire Spencer analyses the Mediterranean as one coherent body, explaining how the southern 'Arab Spring' might have inspired the 'indignados' and other movements in Europe. The author also calls upon policy-makers to acknowledge that the time has come to end the top-down frameworks, which risk to continue being at distance from the citizens who they serve.

Opinion surveys are extremely useful for capturing a moment in time to confirm, or even confound, schematic images of public opinion seized in more tangential and circumstantial ways. What the 2012 Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll Survey reveals about the current state of Euro-Mediterranean intercultural trends is also of more immediate relevance to what comes next than its predecessor of 2009. Conducted after the events of 2011 in the latter half of 2012, this survey necessarily reflects a region, to the North and South of the Mediterranean, that is in a state of flux as well as open to new forms of self-expression.

This means that the views expressed are unlikely to remain static, representing instead an insight into the process of adjusting to new circumstances. They may also, in part, indicate longer-term trends. How the responses are interpreted, however, assumes that there is a common context within which the questions are posed and responded to. In reality, there are many more contexts now than in 2009 which objectively and subjectively shape the way people view the world around them. Whether this contributes to forming a shared vision of the Mediterranean remains in doubt; what it may do is enrich and diversify the debate about what matters to people in and beyond the Mediterranean space, and perhaps most importantly, why.


Mobilisation across the region

This Survey apart, not many examinations of what is now variously referred to as the Arab Awakenings or 'Arab Spring' have encapsulated the sub-regional, or trans-Mediterranean, effects of change and protest witnessed on both sides of the Mediterranean. The protest movement of 'los indignados' in Spain, for example, has more often been analysed in the context of the Eurozone crisis than as an offshoot of the protests that arose earlier across North Africa. Even if the focus of Europe's protest movements have been primarily national, and only residually European in target when they spread among European countries

affected by austerity and high levels of unemployment (Prentoulis and Thomassen, 2013), the example set by events in Tunisia and Egypt from late December 2010 inspired the form that youth-led street protests took in Spain, Greece and beyond.


European protesters have also been focused as much on demands for political inclusion and participation as on the economic demands of whole populations excluded from the perceived financial self-interest of current political establishments (see Manifesto of 'Movimiento 15'). While these demands and the challenges they highlight have yet to be fully met or resolved on either side of the Mediterranean, the idea that societies can act in new ways outside formal political structures is likely to inspire, and re-inspire, similar movements in coming years. Whether they take place within a more consciously defined Euro-Mediterranean space, however, remains to be determined.

Chart 10.1 Interest in news and information about European / some countries



Survey Question: Thinking about SEM / European countries, how much interest would you say you personally have in news and information about their ... ? **Base:** % of all respondents ; % of sum of 'Very interested' and 'Somewhat interested' by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

Chart 10.2 Interactions in the EuroMed region




Survey Question: In the last 12 months have you personally talked to or met with any person (or persons) from SEM / European countries? **Base:** % of all respondents ; % of 'Yes' by country (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

The renewed debate about trans-Mediterranean migration, unleashed by the tragic death-toll of sub-Saharan migrants off the Italian island of Lampedusa in October 2013 (BBC news, 2013), suggests that existing obstacles to establishing more intensified links between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are likely to remain. Alternatively, and now that the problem of sub-Saharan migration has become a domestic as well as external challenge for transiting states, there may be new opportunities to build on the cooperation that has already been established, albeit only at an inter-governmental level so far to police and control illegal migration flows (i.e., RFI, 2014). What has been clearly recognised now is the need for more imaginative, and humane, ways of addressing the movements of people within and beyond the Mediterranean region.

In respect of the evolution of Euro-Mediterranean relations since 2011, the survey data certainly demonstrates that there is a growing appetite for mutual knowledge and understanding. This is in keeping with what might have been expected from a period in which the Mediterranean region has come under a fresh spotlight, given the youth-based and

Chart 10.3 Method of interaction



Survey Question: How did you meet or talk to that person? **Base:** Those who talked to or met with persons from other countries ; % of mentions by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

'new generational' outlook of the region's core protest movements. The 2012 polling data registers high levels of personal interest, including across generational divides, in receiving news and information about political and economic developments on the other side of the Mediterranean. (Chart 10.1) What this means in practice is hard to discern from the figures alone - which range from 88% interest in Germany to 62% (interest in economics) and 58% (interest in politics) in Egypt. It would require further qualitative analysis to ascertain whether this reflects a greater preoccupation with local developments in the case of Egypt, or whether other factors - including European anxiety about the consequences of developments in the southern Mediterranean - come into play.

Social changes and mutual perceptions

The Survey also confirms that positive images of the other have prevailed since 2010, and have even increased as information flows have expanded. The image of the Mediterranean as region of insecurity and turmoil is consistently lower in Europe and the southern Mediterranean (31% and 23% respectively) than the positive attributes accorded to the region of hospitality (50.5% overall) and a distinct way of life and food (56% overall).

Despite official European assurances from 2011 that South-North visa regimes would be reviewed in favour of greater mobility within Europe, the opportunity

to interact directly with others remains skewed in favour of the northern shores of the Mediterranean. Europeans (41% overall) typically register most contacts through business and the tourist destinations of the southern Mediterranean, such as Morocco, which are reflected in the higher numbers of Moroccans (57%) than other southern Mediterraneans (averaging 20%) to have interacted with their European counterparts (Chart 10.2, Chart 10.3).


Even though the image of the Other remains more positive than negative, assessments of whether the Mediterranean's citizens are more engaged in democratic transitions than in resisting change remained evenly balanced on both sides of the Mediterranean. This perception may have changed since the removal of Egypt's President Morsi from office in July 2013 and the setback to electoral politics might be seen in the context of setbacks which ought to be expected in long-term democratic transitions.

The disappointments of the 'Arab Spring' only gained real currency over the course of 2013, prompted by the ongoing instability in Libya, the Mali crisis from January 2013, swiftly followed by the In Amenas gas-plant attack in Algeria, and the wider tragedy of the Syrian conflict, all of which brought the threat of al-Qaeda-inspired jihadism back to the centre-stage of regional security concerns.

How these events have subsequently impacted on European images of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) societies and/or distinguished them from the dynamics which now appear to be governing developments in the Levant and Gulf further east would provide an interesting prism through which to gauge how synergies are changing within, as well as across, the Mediterranean region. The much feared fragmentation, or indeed intangibility, of the Mediterranean Basin as a framework for enhancing North-South cooperation might now, in fact, be better evaluated through its sub-regional alternatives, encompassing both littorals of the Mediterranean.

The most relevant polling data to explore in this respect are the mutual perceptions of Mediterranean societies in closest proximity to each other, such as Morocco, Spain and Portugal, where trade, investment and labour market links have been rising in recent years. More Spaniards consider the 'Arab Spring' to have had a positive (47%) than a negative effect (25%) on European-Arab relations, while 28% combined think it has had no impact, or gave no view on the issue. This suggests that sub-regional cooperation has been growing as much out of the economic crises on both sides of the Western Mediterranean prior to 2011 as from opportunities to identify new areas of

Chart 10.4
Ultimate effect of the 'Arab Spring' on the Euro-Arab relations




Survey Question: Most of the Arab countries are experiencing significant changes started with social movements which have been called an 'Arab Spring'. What do you think, will be the ultimate effects of these changes on the relations between Europe and the Arab countries? Will these changes be [...] **Base:** % of all respondents, by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

common interest arising since the Arab Spring. The Straits of Gibraltar may remain closed to the free circulation of peoples for now, but proximity, as well as necessity, do not always translate into greater animosity or closure to the other despite prevailing cultural and socio-political differences

Implication for the future of the UfM

What this kind of development means in turn for the future of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is really a function of how well known and visible the impacts of its regional and project-led initiatives prove to be. The polling data only captures the potential for the UfM to increase respect for cultural diversity and innovation and entrepreneurship, which register positive scores (up to 85% support) on both sides of the Mediterranean; the realisation of these aspirations remains outside the scope of the questions posed (Chart 6). Even in Euro-Mediterranean policy-making circles, one received wisdom - which the latest generation of UfM officials and staff have worked hard to dispel - is that the UfM is a mere shadow of the ambitions espoused by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (or 'Barcelona process') which preceded it from 1995. Like many inter-governmental processes and agencies, the UfM risks being at a distance from the citizens whose lives its various mandates - on regional energy, infrastructure and water cooperation, as well as youth and women's employment and education - seek to improve. It is dependent on raising private sector backing as well as public funding for its initiatives and is likely to succeed only insofar as its importance is recognised by its key stakeholders as well as its target audiences. In troubled times, it is easy to overlook the importance of regional initiatives to

Chart 10.5
What society would gain from UfM



Survey Question: Your country, with other European countries and the countries on the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean, has decided to establish closer political, economic and cultural exchanges, within a project called 'Union for the Mediterranean'. Which of the mentioned aspects do you think your society can gain from such a shared project? **Base:** All respondents (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

galvanise new ways of stimulating cooperation: even where they are making progress - as in the UfM's role joining up regional transport infrastructure such as the Trans-Maghreb Highway project across North Africa (UfM, 2012) - they only work if the local political and economic conditions permit and actors other than the UfM also engage in supporting them.

The total sum of efforts made by those now active on the Mediterranean arena, both virtual and tangible, are likely to be the best measure of whether the Mediterranean, as a region, has a future relevant to the peoples who live there or are just passing through. Most attempts in the past to create a template or vision for the Mediterranean have been swiftly disappointed by the lack of sustainable leadership to see such visions materialise and prevail. The plurality of the Mediterranean has always been one of its characteristics, woven through by the common virtues captured by the survey, of openness, hospitality and the joie de vie of its coastal lifestyles and cuisine. In an era when pluralism, inclusion, justice and mutual acceptance have been at the forefront of protest

movements across the Mediterranean region, we may be nearing the end of top-down visions and frameworks designed by inter-governmental committees. If the alternatives play to the Mediterranean's historical strengths of cultural and linguistic exchange and the gradual integration of diversity, then so much the better. The varying, and variable, results that emerge are more likely to meet the needs and aspirations of respondents actively shaping their own new contexts than a 'one-size-fits-all' umbrella or plan.

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